Sunday, April 24, 2011

1a 2ae q61 a4: Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? Yes.

Has quatuor virtutes sunt diversi habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti quia determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est:

These four [cardinal] virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects because they have their special determinate matter; indeed, each of these [virtues] is determined to its [own] one [special] matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken, as stated above (I-II, 61, 3; cf. II-II, 141, 2):

"istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter principalitatem materiae: puta quod prudentia dicatur quae praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis."

"they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter. And thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal [i.e., cardinal] in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death."

Sunday, April 17, 2011

1a 2ae q61 a3: Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these? No.

Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias reducit quia huiusmodi quatuor virtutes cardinales accipiuntur secundum quatuor formales rationes virtutis de qua loquimur.

Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii) because these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues in respect of the four formal aspects of virtue about which we now shall speak:

Dicuntur principales, quasi generales ad omnes virtutes: utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo.

They are called the principal formal aspects, since they are general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude.

Sunday, April 03, 2011

1a 2ae q61 a2: Whether there are four cardinal virtues? Yes.

Prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus; sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere, quia quadruplex invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum fortitudinis.

Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply; the others are principal, each in its own genus, because there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold: the will, subject of "Justice"; the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance"; and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude".

Numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia, aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes.

Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are, and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.

Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., "in quatuor virtutibus tota boni operis structura consurgit".

Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of a good work is built on four virtues".